

G20 Scorecard Methodology

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Overview

This scorecard was initially inspired by the priorities outlined in the United Nations secretary-general's 2023 Acceleration Agendaⁱ and later expanded and updated to align with The Climate Reality Project's priorities.

Sources used include official agreements brought forward by the G20 at various meetings, data from countries' national websites, research generated by nonprofits and advocacy organizations, and news articles. Public data varies in both availability and completeness by country, especially for columns that rely on accurate budget data, and keyword Google searches for news articles in the absence of robust research are unlikely to capture the full picture. This led to a degree of uncertainty and possible inconsistency in the scorecard.

Note that assessments of stated commitments (columns B, C, D, E, H, K, L, and M) may not take into account backsliding/failure to uphold commitments.

In this iteration of the scorecard, we limit our analysis to public financing only due to the severely limited availability of information on private finance and policies specific to ending such private financing by individual entities and/or countries.

We define “phaseout” (as in coal and oil and gas) as ceasing both production and use of a fuel across all sectors, without the qualifier “unabated.” This is narrower than many international agreements, which allow for a massive loophole in the use of largely unproven-at-scale abatement technologies. In some cases, we allow for partial recognition of action by countries that applied the abatement loophole to hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement production, or if their phaseout targets were limited to the electricity sector, as these still may signify substantial progress. However, to reach true net zero and hold warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, a full phaseout under our definition is essential.

For goals that include different targets for developed or developing countries, we used the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's 2023 World Investment [Report](#) to track which G20 countries are designated as developed or developing. While we recognize that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) uses different country classifications (i.e., Annexes), the UN secretary-general's 2023 Acceleration Agenda that initially inspired our scorecard used the language of developed and developing.ⁱⁱ

Please contact us at scorecard@climatereality.com with any questions or concerns.

Key

✓ - Available information suggested the statement is true.

- ✓ - Used in certain cases when statement appears partially true (see columns C and E)
- ✗ - Available information suggested the statement is false.
- ? - Available information did not allow us to come to a confident conclusion.

Methods by Column

Goal to reach net zero by 2040 (developed countries) or 2050 (developing countries)

Column B in scorecard worksheet

The target dates of 2040/2050 were chosen based on the UN secretary-general's Acceleration Agenda, to push for more ambition from countries historically most responsible for climate change. We utilized Climate Action Tracker (CAT) to find the net zero targets of countries that CAT analyzes (every country except France, Italy, and the African Union), which often looks at nations' Long-Term Strategies submitted to the UNFCCC. Additional Google searches were performed for countries not analyzed by CAT and to confirm that CAT research was up to date when a CAT country page had not been updated more recently than 2023.

Countries received a ✓ if they had a net zero target of 2040 for developed countries and 2050 for developing countries.

Commitment to phase out coal by 2030 (OECD countries) or 2040 (non-OECD countries)

Column C in scorecard worksheet

Some countries in the G20 signed an agreement at COP 26 to phase out unabated coal electricity generation in the 2030s (major economies) or 2040s (globally).ⁱⁱⁱ Several G20 countries are also part of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which also focuses on phasing out unabated coal electricity generation, though without a mandated date.^{iv}

However, this is not ambitious enough for our standards. We define coal phaseout as ceasing both production and use of all coal across all sectors, without the qualifier “unabated.” We used Bloomberg Coal Countdown initially to look at countries' coal phaseout plans. Climate Action Tracker was used for Saudi Arabia and the European Union, which were not evaluated by Bloomberg Coal Countdown. Google searches were used for the African Union, which was evaluated by neither Bloomberg Coal Countdown nor Climate Action Tracker. Google searches were also used to corroborate Bloomberg Coal Countdown and Climate Action Tracker information and uncover more specifics about plans which Bloomberg may consider to be a phaseout but that do not meet our ambitious criteria.

Countries received a ✓ in this category if they had a clear coal phaseout commitment for the prescribed dates, across all sectors, without using the qualifier “unabated.” Countries received a ✓ if they had a clear coal phaseout commitment for the prescribed dates without using the qualifier “unabated” but limited it to the electricity sector. Countries would also receive a ✓ if they had a clear coal phaseout

commitment for the prescribed dates across sectors but used the qualifier “unabated” only for the use of coal in hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement production, though no countries passed even this threshold.

Commitment to phase out oil and gas by 2050

Column D in scorecard worksheet

Countries received a ✓ if they had a clear commitment to phase out all oil and gas across all sectors by 2050, without the qualifier “unabated.” CAT and Google searches were used to find this information. Countries would receive a ✓ if they used the qualifier “unabated” only for hard-to-abate sectors, though no countries passed even this threshold.

Stated support for a fossil fuel phaseout agreement

Column E in scorecard worksheet

We looked at which G20 countries had pledged their support for a phaseout of fossil fuels (which includes coal, oil, and gas) around the time of COP 28 in Dubai.

Countries that received a ✗ either had no record we could find of stated support or were found to explicitly state their opposition. Two countries, China and India, that had not explicitly commented on whether or not they would support a fossil fuel phaseout agreement also received a ✗. The African Union received a ✗ given its lack of a union-wide call for a phaseout.

Countries receiving a ✓ must have stated their support for a full phaseout of all fossil fuels without the use of abatement and removal technologies such as CCS and CCUS. Countries could receive a ✓ indicating their support for the phase out of fossil fuels, but with removal technologies *limited to use in hard to abate sectors* such as steel, cement, and fertilizer production.

Has ended international public coal funding

Column F in scorecard worksheet

All G20 countries should have completed this step due to the G20 agreement to end international public coal funding by the end of 2021.^v However, there has been backsliding and failure to implement this commitment. Therefore, we endeavored to find a source that tracked actual funding rather than stated commitment. We used Oil Change International’s Public Finance for Energy Database for all countries.^{vi}

Countries received a ✓ if there was no international public coal funding recorded in this database in the most recent year provided. The database provides data as recent as 2022 for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data is only available up to 2021 for Russia and Saudi Arabia, and only up to 2020 for India,

Indonesia, and Turkey up to the time that this scorecard was published.^{vii} We only used data from 2021 or more recent; therefore, India, Indonesia, and Turkey received ?. This inconsistency in data availability is a significant limitation to this column, and for that reason these evaluations should be used with caution.

We intend to update this column when the Public Finance for Energy Database is updated with more recent data. Oil Change International notes limited or no data availability for Argentina, Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, meaning results for those countries should be interpreted with caution.^{viii} The African Union and European Union also received ? because they were not covered in the database as units.

Has ended public international oil and gas funding

Column G in scorecard worksheet

We looked at the Public Finance for Energy Database to see which countries in the G20 had ended public international oil and gas funding as of 2021/2022. The database provides data as recent as 2022 for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data is only available up to 2021 for Russia and Saudi Arabia, and only up to 2020 for India, Indonesia, and Turkey up to the time that this scorecard was published.^{ix} We only used data from 2021 or more recent; therefore, India, Indonesia, and Turkey received ?. While we recognize that this is not the most recent year, and many countries have since committed to end public international funding of fossil fuels, we chose the Database as it had the most consistent and available data. As our scorecard will be updated twice-annually, we may be able to change this category to reflect more recent events – and fill in the gaps for the previously mentioned countries – provided a reliable source with such data appears.

Lack of data availability for the African Union also led us to score it as ?. The UK is seen as having provided [no funding](#) to international fossil fuel projects for 2022 (instead funneling public money into international clean energy projects). It has also implemented policies [restricting](#) fossil fuel finance. Because of this, it receives a ✓. Additionally, the European Union received a ✗ due to [varying action](#) on public international oil and gas finance by member states. As such, with Germany, France, and Italy [all having funded](#) oil and gas projects during 2022, this was enough for us to rate the EU as ✗.

Commitment to end fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 (developed countries) or 2030 (developing countries)

Column H in scorecard worksheet

Google searches were performed to find country commitments given that we do not know of a single source that tracks country commitments to phase out fossil fuel subsidies. Commitments to end only “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies are considered

insufficient under this metric. However, we recognize these steps forward with ✓ instead of ✓. All G20 countries except the US are signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which in 1992 set a date of 2020 for subsidies “harmful to biodiversity” to be phased out or reformed to minimize or avoid negative impacts.^x This can be interpreted to include fossil fuels; however, countries have largely not been held to account for this agreement, and the loophole of reform to “minimize” negative impacts led us to consider this insufficient as well.

Increasing clean energy subsidies

Column I in scorecard worksheet

Energypolicytracker.org was used to compare clean energy funding levels in December 2020 to those in December 2021. Funding levels for December 2020 and December 2021 included “clean conditional” and “clean unconditional” funding listed in the area graph provided on each country page.

If “other energy” increased from December 2020 to December 2021, the provided table of policies for each country was examined to see if any of the “other energy” projects implemented in 2021 were for nuclear energy, which we consider to be clean energy due to its emissions profile. Only nuclear projects clearly labeled as such in the Energy Policy Tracker’s table for each country were included; this could have led to small amounts of nuclear funding included in other policies being unaccounted for. Policies with “unquantified” values committed were not included.

Countries received ✓ if they had greater funding for clean energy in 2021 than in 2020. The African Union received a ✗ because we know not all member states are increasing clean energy subsidies, given that South Africa received a ✗. The EU was evaluated using Energy Policy Tracker’s European Institutions page. All figures are in USD. It is important to note that users should use caution in interpreting this column due to the data being a few years old. We intend to update this when Energy Policy Tracker releases more recent data.

2030 emissions reduction targets consistent with 1.5 C (in accordance with fair share)

Column J in scorecard worksheet

We looked at Climate Action Tracker’s (CAT) analysis of 2030 targets within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and used their determination of whether or not a country’s 2030 emissions reduction targets were in accordance with a 1.5 degree C pathway and aligned with each country’s fair share of emissions reductions.

For a country to receive a ✓, its 2030 targets must have been rated as “sufficient” by CAT – anything “almost sufficient” or lower (insufficient, highly insufficient, critically insufficient) led us to mark said country as ✗. We included additional analysis for the countries of France and Italy from Climate Analytics. This is due to lack of analysis of these countries by Climate Action Tracker. While CAT is updated in accordance with new NDCs, Climate Analytics appears to be updated less frequently,

which may be a limitation for those countries as we did not perform additional research to corroborate them. Additionally, lack of a union-wide 2030 emissions reduction target for the African Union led us to mark it as ? for this category.

Commitment to reduce methane emissions 30% from 2020 levels by 2030

Column K in scorecard worksheet

We looked at which countries or supranational unions are [signatories](#) to the [Global Methane Pledge](#), which aims to cut anthropogenic methane emissions at least 30% by 2030 from 2020 levels to help keep 1.5 degrees C of warming within reach.

If countries have signed on to the pledge, they received a ✓. All others received a ✗. The African Union received a ✗ due to a lack of a union-wide pledge and for certain individual countries within the union (such as South Africa) not being signatories to the Global Methane Pledge.

Stated support of MDB reform to increase climate funding and address the debt crisis

Column L in scorecard worksheet

Due to the [2023 G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration's \(which was reached by consensus\) mention](#) of “Pursue reforms for better, bigger and more effective Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to address global challenges to maximize developmental impact,” and “Promote resilient growth by urgently and effectively addressing debt vulnerabilities in developing countries,” under paragraph 5e and h, we interpreted every G20 country as having stated their support of MDB reform. [MDB reform](#) would ultimately encompass addressing debt vulnerabilities and the increase of climate funding, which is a global challenge.

Social Progress Imperative's Just Transition Score

Column M in scorecard worksheet

Scores come from the Social Progress Imperative's Just Transition Score, which combines the Social Progress Index with data on consumption-based per capita CO₂ emissions.^{xi} The score for the African Union is an average of every member country scored in this source as a score for the African Union was not provided by Social Progress Imperative. Scores are relative.

References by Column

Goal to reach net zero by 2040 (developed countries) or 2050 (developing countries)

Column B in scorecard worksheet

- **African Union (developing): No.** Its Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032) acknowledges that the IPCC requires net zero emissions to be reached by 2050 to hold warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius, but nowhere in that plan does it commit to aligning its own net zero

plans with that timeline.^{xii} Ahead of COP 27, African Union energy commissioner noted that the entity “may differ ... on the [net zero] timeline.”^{xiii} CAT does not assess the AU.

- **Argentina (developing): Yes.** “GHG neutrality” target of 2050 established in the long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC in November 2022. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xiv}
- **Australia (developed): No.** 2050 target date established in the long-term strategy submitted to UNFCCC in October 2021, included in an updated NDC in June 2022, and made law in 2022. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xv}
- **Brazil (developing): Yes.** Target to reach “climate neutrality” by 2050 reiterated in its 2023 NDC submission, but note that Brazil has not submitted a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC, and therefore CAT does not have sufficient details to rate the comprehensiveness of the target.^{xvi}
- **Canada (developed): No.** Net zero by 2050 target became law in 2021 and is in its long-term strategy update submitted to the UNFCCC in October 2022. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “average.”^{xvii}
- **China (developing): No.** Target to reach “carbon neutrality” before 2060 declared at the September 2020 UN General Assembly and in its long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC in October 2021. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xviii}
- **France (developed): No.** Commitment to “eliminate greenhouse gas emissions on national soil by 2050” stated on France’s government website. This was in President Macron’s “climate plan” in 2017 and became law in 2019; it amounts to an 85% cut in emissions by 2050, excluding LULUCF.^{xix} CAT does not assess France.
- **Germany (developed): No.** The date alone is stronger than most developed countries, at 2045, which was adopted as law in 2021 and included in the November 2022 long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC. However, it still does not meet our threshold of 2040. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “average.”^{xx}
- **India (developing): No.** 2070 target announced at COP 26 in 2021 and in its long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC at COP 27 in 2022. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xxi}
- **Indonesia (developing): No.** Does not have an explicit net zero target but “explores scenarios that could lead to net zero by 2060 or sooner” in its long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC in July 2021 according to CAT. CAT does not rate its comprehensiveness due to this lack of information. Other sources like the International Energy Agency (IEA) interpret this as a commitment to net zero by 2060.^{xxii}
- **Italy (developed): No.** Italy falls under the overall EU goal of 2050 (see below), which it confirmed in its draft National Energy and Climate Plan in 2023.^{xxiii}
- **Japan (developed): No.** Japan published a net zero target of 2050 in October 2020, which was made into law in 2021 and reflected in its long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC ahead of COP 26 in 2021. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xxiv}

- **Mexico (developing): No.** Mexico has affirmed its commitment to net zero by 2050 in alignment with the Paris Agreement principles of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but it has not released a concrete net zero target.^{xxv}
- **Russia (developed): No.** Russia’s long-term strategy submitted to the UNFCCC in September 2022 includes a net zero goal of 2060. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xxvi}
- **Saudi Arabia (developing): No.** Saudi Arabia announced a net zero goal of 2060 in October 2021 but has not submitted a long-term strategy to UNFCCC or made it law. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xxvii}
- **South Africa (developing): Yes.** South Africa committed to “net zero carbon emissions” by 2050 in a visionary statement in its long-term strategy submitted to UNFCCC in 2020. However, it has not given enough details on the target for CAT to rate it.^{xxviii}
- **South Korea (developed): No.** South Korea’s long-term strategy submitted to UNFCCC in 2020 and its updated NDC in 2021 both included a commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050. This was made law in 2021 (enforced in 2022). Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “average.”^{xxix}
- **Turkey (developing): No.** Turkey committed to net zero by 2053 in 2021 in an announcement but has still not submitted a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “poor.”^{xxx}
- **United Kingdom (developed): No.** The UK made a net zero target of 2050 law in 2019 and included it in a long-term strategy submitted to UNFCCC in 2021. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “acceptable.”^{xxxi}
- **United States (developed): No.** In its long-term strategy submitted to UNFCCC in November 2021, the US committed to net zero by 2050 at the latest. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “average.”^{xxxii}
- **European Union (developed): No.** The EU included a goal for achieving a “climate neutral EU by 2050” in its long-term strategy submitted to UNFCCC in 2020 and made that goal law in 2021. Note that CAT rates its comprehensiveness as “acceptable.”^{xxxiii}

Commitment to phase out coal by 2030 (OECD countries) or 2040 (non-OECD countries)

Column C in scorecard worksheet

- **African Union: No.** The 2023 Nairobi Declaration called for a global phasedown of coal but did not specify a date or commit African Union nations to a phaseout.^{xxxiv}
- **Argentina: No.** Argentina has no coal phaseout commitment.^{xxxv}
- **Australia: No.** Argentina has no coal phaseout commitment.^{xxxvi}
- **Brazil: No.** Brazil has no coal phaseout commitment.^{xxxvii}
- **Canada: No.** Canada aims to phase out unabated coal electricity generation by 2030.^{xxxviii} However, this is not considered a full phaseout for our standards due to its specification “unabated” and being limited to the electricity sector.
- **China: No.** China has no coal phaseout commitment.^{xxxix}
- **France: Partly.** France initially planned to phase out coal electricity generation by 2023, then brought that forward to 2022, but in September 2023 it

announced it was pushing it back to 2027.^{xi} It has stated an intention to phase out coal electricity generation definitively by 2030 at the latest.^{xii} France does not specify “unabated” and adheres to our timeline, even though it is limited to the electricity sector, which earns it a ✓.

- **Germany: No.** Germany’s legally determined coal electricity generation phaseout date is 2038.^{xiii} Early in 2023, the economy minister pushed for 2030, but in November 2023 the finance minister indicated that was unlikely.^{xiiii} Though this does not specify “unabated,” it does not adhere to our timeline and is limited to the electricity sector.
- **India: No.** India has no coal phaseout commitment.^{xliv}
- **Indonesia: No.** In 2022 Indonesia announced it will phase out unabated coal electricity generation by 2050. Even this date of 2050 has been met with skepticism given government officials’ unwillingness to get the transition going in a meaningful way.^{xlv}
- **Italy: No.** Italy announced it will phase out coal electricity generation by 2025 in 2017 (confirmed in 2019), though this was pushed back to 2027 due to interconnection delays preventing one coal plant closure.^{xlvi} Italy does not specify “unabated” and adheres to our timeline, even though it is limited to the electricity sector, which earns it a ✓.
- **Japan: No.** Japan has no coal phaseout commitment. In 2020 Japan announced it would phase out “inefficient” subcritical coal power plants by 2030.^{xlvii}
- **Mexico: No.** Mexico has no coal phaseout commitment. Though it is a member of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, where members agree to phase out unabated coal electricity generation by an unspecified date, the current president has ramped up support for fossil fuels, including coal.^{xlviii}
- **Russia: No.** Russia has no coal phaseout commitment.^{xlix}
- **Saudi Arabia: No.** Saudi Arabia uses and produces very little coal; however, it has not committed even to the low-hanging fruit that would be a coal phaseout pledge given its national circumstances.¹
- **South Africa: No.** South Africa has no coal phaseout commitment.^{li}
- **South Korea: No.** South Korea plans to phase out coal electricity generation by 2050.^{lii} Though this plan does not specify “unabated,” it does not adhere to our timeline and is limited to the electricity sector.
- **Turkey: No.** Turkey has no coal phaseout commitment.^{liii}
- **United Kingdom: No.** The UK plans to phase out unabated coal by 2024 in the electricity sector and was the first country to do so.^{liv} However, this is not considered a full phaseout for our standards as it uses the qualifier “unabated” and is limited to the electricity sector. For example, the UK approved a new coal mine in 2022 for use in steelmaking.^{lv}
- **United States: No.** The US has no coal phaseout commitment date. Current regulations and commitments may indicate there will be no more coal power plants operating in the US by 2035, and it is part of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, where members agree to phase out unabated coal power generation by an unspecified date.^{lvi}

- **European Union: No.** The EU has no coal phaseout commitment date. Member state action varies.^{lvii}

Commitment to phase out oil and gas by 2050

Column D in scorecard worksheet

- **African Union: No.** The African Union has indicated no support for an oil and gas phaseout and has even indicated support for gas, pushing it as a transition fuel in the “short to medium term” ahead of COP 27.^{lviii}
- **Argentina: No.** Argentina has indicated no support for an oil and gas phaseout and is even focusing on gas production.^{lix}
- **Australia: No.** Australia supported a phaseout of fossil fuels at COP 28 but still has no oil and gas phaseout timeline and has been supporting fossil fuel production. It remains to be seen whether Australia will align its policy with its rhetoric.^{lx}
- **Brazil: No.** Brazil plans to increase oil and gas production by 2031 and has no phaseout plan.^{lxi} Brazil joined OPEC+ in 2023. Brazil claims its purpose in the group is to convince oil producers to transition away from fossil fuels, though its state-run oil company is ramping up exploration.^{lxii}
- **Canada: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023,^{lxiii} which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.” Canada itself has no set national plan to phase out oil and gas entirely.^{lxiv} Canada has an emission reduction plan for oil and gas companies by 2030 through a cap-and-trade system.^{lxv} Quebec is a member of BOGA but the country as a whole is not.^{lxvi}
- **China: No.** China has no plans to phase out oil and gas and has maintained that it is unrealistic.^{lxvii}
- **France: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.”^{lxviii} France comes the closest of any country to receiving a yes. France is a core member of the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (BOGA).^{lxix} Its draft climate and energy roadmap, released in November 2023, set a vision of an end to “dependence on fossil fuels” by 2050 (without the qualifier “unabated”),^{lxx} and it passed a law banning oil and gas production and exploration on national soil by 2040 in 2017, though it has been found to be the largest supporter of major fossil fuel extraction projects in Europe.^{lxxi} It also advocated for a stronger oil and gas phaseout stance by the EU at COP 28.^{lxxii} However, we do not consider France’s vision to be a full phaseout commitment.
- **Germany: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.”^{lxxiii} Germany did advocate for a fossil fuel phaseout at COP 28.^{lxxiv} However, the German government has looked into ramping up LNG imports and retracting the country’s COP 26 pledge to end international fossil fuel financing.^{lxxv} The

German government did pass legislation banning all newly installed oil and gas heating systems in 2023.^{lxxvi}

- **India: No.** India has no national timeline to phase out oil and gas, though it did advocate for a phasedown of all fossil fuels at COP 27 and has called for faster transition away from fossil fuels for developed countries.^{lxxvii}
- **Indonesia: No.** Indonesia has no national timeline to phase out oil and gas. Its phaseout of coal in 2050 is the focus of most conversation as this will already be a difficult goal to achieve given its current policies and trends.^{lxxviii}
- **Italy: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.”^{lxxix} Italy is a “friend” of BOGA.^{lxxx} However, Italian oil company Eni (of which the government controls 30%) has been doubling down on oil and gas extraction, indicating it will increase production until at least 2030 and advocate for gas expansion over the next decades.^{lxxxi} The current government aims to make Italy a “gas hub,” and there are no clear national timelines for oil and gas phaseout.^{lxxxii}
- **Japan: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.”^{lxxxiii} Japan’s economy, trade, and industry minister confirmed this statement, saying that the country would work to phase out unabated fossil fuels, but Japan has not committed to a national oil and gas phaseout date.^{lxxxiv}
- **Mexico: No.** Mexico’s current president is committed to increasing oil and gas production, and Mexico has no target for oil and gas phaseout.^{lxxxv}
- **Russia: No.** Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035 almost exclusively outlines plans to continue prioritizing its fossil fuel energy, and it has no oil and gas phaseout target.^{lxxxvi}
- **Saudi Arabia: No.** Saudi Arabia has no intention to phase out fossil fuels and has heavily advocated against a fossil fuel phaseout (or even phasedown) agreement at COP.^{lxxxvii}
- **South Africa: No.** South Africa has not made any oil and gas phaseout commitments.^{lxxxviii}
- **South Korea: No.** South Korea has no plans for an oil and gas phaseout and intends to rely on LNG during its coal phaseout.^{lxxxix}
- **Turkey: No.** Turkey continues to promote oil and gas and has no phaseout plans.^{xc}
- **United Kingdom: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.” Though the UK helped secure this agreement, the UK has been hard to pin down on full fossil fuel phaseout, continues to support oil and gas, and has not committed to a national oil and gas phaseout date.^{xcii}
- **United States: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.”^{xcii} The

United States did support a fossil fuel phaseout at COP 28.^{xciii} However, the US continues to increase oil and gas production and exports and has not set a date for a national oil and gas phaseout.^{xciv} Though the US is not part of BOGA, Washington state is a core member and California is a founding associate member of the alliance.^{xcv}

- **European Union: No.** The G7 promised an accelerated phaseout of unabated fossil fuels to achieve net zero energy systems by 2050 at the latest in 2023, which is not sufficient for our standards given the blanket qualifier “unabated.”^{xcvi} The EU did advocate for the COP 28 president to push for a fossil fuel phaseout.^{xcvii} However, the EU has not included an oil and gas phaseout date in its climate targets.^{xcviii}

Stated support for a fossil fuel phaseout agreement

Column E in scorecard worksheet

- **African Union: No.** No record of union-wide support found.
- **Argentina: No.** No record found.
- **Australia: Partly.** Australian climate change minister Chris Bowen declared phasing out fossil fuels globally as central to Australia’s desire to increase renewable energy capacity. Also, as part of The Umbrella Group – including other nations such as Canada, the UK, and the US – he also confirmed Australia and the group’s support of a fossil fuel phaseout, but that phaseout could include abatement (our interpretation is that this would be for hard to abate sectors).^{xcix}
- **Brazil: No.** Brazil is not explicitly in support of a fossil fuel phaseout agreement, with the viewpoint of striking a “nuanced balance” between battling climate change and promoting economic growth – a reduction in fossil fuel use but without abrupt measures that could negatively impact its economy.^c
- **Canada: No.** No record found.
- **China: No.** China was not explicit on whether or not it would support a full fossil fuel phaseout agreement when asked at COP 28 in Dubai.^{ci}
- **France: Partly.** France is included within the EU’s position on fossil fuel phaseout with removal technologies limited to use in hard to abate sectors.^{cii}
- **Germany: Partly.** Germany is included within the EU’s position on fossil fuel phaseout with removal technologies limited to use in hard to abate sectors.^{ciii}
- **Italy: Partly.** Italy is included within the EU’s position on fossil fuel phaseout with removal technologies limited to use in hard to abate sectors.^{civ}
- **India: No.** Along with China, India was not explicit in its support of a full fossil fuel phaseout agreement at COP 28 in Dubai.^{cv}
- **Indonesia: No.** No record found.
- **Mexico: No.** No record found.
- **Russia: No.** Russia has stated that it is opposed to “any provisions or outcomes that somehow discriminate or call for phaseout of any specific energy source or fossil fuel type.”^{cvii}
- **Saudi Arabia: No.** Saudi Arabia was a main blocker of fossil fuel phaseout language at COP 28 in Dubai.^{cviii}

- **South Korea: No.** No record found.
- **South Africa: No.** No record of support found, and South Africa left the OACPS (effective September 2022), disqualifying it from the joint declaration with the EU-27 on support of a fossil fuel phaseout.^{cviii}
- **Turkey: No.** Turkey was noted as being one of the most vocal opponents of a fossil fuel phaseout agreement at COP 28 in Dubai.^{cix}
- **United Kingdom: No.** While the UK may support a phaseout of unabated fossil fuels, the lack of guardrails around the use of removal technologies such as CCS disqualifies it from our definition of phaseout support.^{cx}
- **United States: Yes.** Special Climate Envoy John Kerry stated the USA’s support of an agreement phasing out unabated fossil fuels with guardrails around carbon capture and storage focused on steel, cement, and aluminum.^{cxii}
- **European Union: Partly.** In October 2023, the EU released its position on the upcoming COP 28 conference, underlining that the shift towards a climate-neutral economy in line with the 1.5C goal requires the phaseout of fossil fuels, and that abatement technologies are to be limited to hard to abate sectors.^{cxiii}

Has ended public international coal funding

Column F in scorecard worksheet

All country evaluations were determined based on Oil Change International’s Public Finance for Energy Database.^{cxiii}

Has ended public international oil and gas funding

Column G in scorecard worksheet

All country evaluations were determined based on Oil Change International’s Public Finance for Energy Database.^{cxiv}

Commitment to end fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 (developed countries) or 2030 (developing countries)

Column H in scorecard worksheet

In 2009, G20 countries committed to “phase out and rationalize over the medium-term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.”^{cxv}

- **African Union: No.** The African Union called for the global community to uphold commitments to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies in the 2023 Nairobi Declaration, but the African Union itself does not appear to have made a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030.^{cxvi}
- **Argentina: No.** Argentina does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030.
- **Australia: No.** Australia does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2025. Additionally, after a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies, Australia – along with several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxvii}
- **Brazil: No.** Brazil plans to continue subsidizing coal until at least 2040. Additionally, after a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies,

Brazil – along with several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxviii}

- **Canada: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓. Canada is also the only G20 country with an implementation plan for this phaseout of “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025.^{cxix} However, Canada does not have a plan to phase out *all* fossil fuel subsidies by that date. The G7 committed to ending “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016.^{cxx} Canada joined 11 other countries (only one of which is G20) at COP 28 in a joint statement on fossil fuel subsidies, which acknowledged the need to phase them out and intends to spur the creation of phaseout plans but did not go as far as to commit to a phaseout date. The agreement committed the countries to transparency, identifying international barriers, and facilitating dialogue on fossil fuel subsidy phaseout.^{cxxi}
- **China: No.** China does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030.
- **France: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxxii} However, France has not outlined a plan to achieve that goal or committed to end all fossil fuel subsidies by that date. It has recently walked back a decision to remove some fossil fuel subsidies due to protests from farmers.^{cxxiii} Additionally, after a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies, France – along with several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxxiv} France joined 11 other countries (only one of which is G20) at COP 28 in a joint statement on fossil fuel subsidies, which acknowledged the need to phase them out and intends to spur the creation of phaseout plans.^{cxvxcxxvi}
- **Germany: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxxvii} However, Germany does not specify a clear end date for all fossil fuel subsidies in its laws or plans.^{cxxviii}
- **India: No.** India does not have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030 and advocated against references to subsidy phaseout in the COP 26 decision.^{cxxix}
- **Indonesia: No.** Indonesia does not have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030, and there is no indication that the president-elect intends to make one.^{cxxx}
- **Italy: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxxxi} However, Italy has not specified a clear end date for all fossil fuel subsidies in its laws or plans.^{cxxxi}
- **Japan: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxxxi} However, Japan has not separately committed to ending all fossil fuel subsidies by that date or shown signs of being willing to go beyond that commitment. Additionally, after a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies, Japan – along with

several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxxxiv}

- **Mexico: No.** The current administration has pledged to reduce fossil fuel subsidies, but Mexico has not committed to phasing out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030.^{cxxxv}
- **Russia: No.** Russia does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030.
- **Saudi Arabia: No.** Saudi Arabia acknowledged the need to reform its fossil fuel subsidies in its “Vision 2030” strategy but does not have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030. After a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies, Saudi Arabia – along with several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxxxvi} Note that Saudi Arabia had the highest fossil fuel subsidies per capita of the G20 countries (not looking at the EU and AU) in 2022 according to the IMF (over \$3,500. Korea, the second highest, had \$1,250).^{cxxxvii}
- **South Africa: No.** South Africa does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030. Additionally, after a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies, South Africa – along with several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxxxviii}
- **South Korea: No.** South Korea does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2025.
- **Turkey: No.** Turkey does not appear to have a commitment to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2030.
- **United Kingdom: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxxxix} However, the UK does not have a separate commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies by that date, and the UK Treasury has even denied it provides any subsidies at all. After a 2009 commitment to phase out “inefficient” subsidies, the UK – along with several other G20 countries – claimed it did not have any fossil fuel subsidies that counted as inefficient.^{cxl}
- **United States: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxli} However, the US does not have a separate commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies by that date, and even recent climate laws like the IRA have implemented fossil fuel subsidies that will extend past this date.^{cxlii}
- **European Union: Partly.** The G7 committed to phasing out “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 in 2016, earning all G7 countries a ✓.^{cxliii} The European Parliament called for an end of all fossil fuel subsidies globally by 2025 ahead of COP 28, but this position was weaker in the EU’s final position statement, and it has not made its own commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies by 2025.^{cxliv}

Increasing clean energy subsidies

Column I in scorecard worksheet

- **African Union: No.** The African Union is not analyzed as a unit by Energy Policy Tracker; however, given that clean energy subsidies are not increasing in South Africa (see below), meaning not all member states are increasing clean energy subsidies if any, the African Union receives a ×.
- **Argentina: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$0 at the end of 2020 to \$0.6 billion at the end of 2021. Other energy did not change from 2020 to 2021, so nuclear was not examined.^{cxlv}
- **Australia: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$1.93 billion at the end of 2020 to \$4.54 billion at the end of 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{cxlvi}
- **Brazil: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$0.87 billion at the end of 2020 to \$0.95 billion at the end of 2021. Other energy did increase as well, and two nuclear policies were announced in 2021, but values were unquantified.^{cxlvii}
- **Canada: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$19.81 billion at the end of 2020 to \$41.89 billion at the end of 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{cxlviii}
- **China: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$20.09 billion in 2020 to \$20.52 billion at the end of 2021. Other energy did not change from 2020 to 2021, so nuclear was not examined.^{cxlix}
- **France: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined stayed constant at \$22.78 billion in 2020 and 2021, but other energy increased, partly due to an announcement of \$1.14 billion toward nuclear in 2021.^{cl}
- **Germany: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$29.23 billion in 2020 to \$41.71 billion in 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{cli}
- **India: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$31.34 billion in 2020 to \$41.24 billion in 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{clii}
- **Indonesia: No.** Conditional clean energy funding stayed constant at \$0.24 billion from 2020 to 2021, and no funding was recorded for unconditional clean energy or other energy.^{cliii}
- **Italy: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$0.9 billion in 2020 to \$49.09 billion in 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{cliv}
- **Japan: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$19.13 billion in 2020 to \$19.75 billion in 2021. Other energy did not change from 2020 to 2021, so nuclear was not examined.^{clv}
- **Mexico: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$0.92 billion in 2020 to \$1.94 billion in 2021. No funding was recorded for other energy.^{clvi}
- **Russia: No.** No funding was recorded for conditional or unconditional clean energy or other energy.^{clvii}

- **Saudi Arabia: Yes.** Unconditional clean energy funding increased from \$0 in 2020 to \$0.91 billion in 2021. No funding was recorded for conditional clean energy or other energy.^{clviii}
- **South Africa: No.** No funding was recorded for conditional or unconditional clean energy or other energy.^{clix}
- **South Korea: No.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding stayed constant at \$1.24 billion from 2020 to 2021. Other energy did not change from 2020 to 2021, so nuclear was not examined.^{clx}
- **Turkey: Yes.** Conditional clean energy funding increased from \$0.06 billion in 2020 to \$0.07 billion in 2021. No funding was recorded for unconditional clean energy or other energy.^{clxi}
- **United Kingdom: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$21.97 billion in 2020 \$33.05 billion in 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{clxii}
- **United States: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$27.35 billion in 2020 to \$144.61 billion in 2021. Other energy did increase as well, including \$69.21 billion for nuclear alone in 2021 and \$20 million toward hydrogen produced with nuclear.^{clxiii}
- **European Union: Yes.** Conditional and unconditional clean energy funding combined increased from \$0.11 billion in 2020 to \$5.73 billion in 2021. Other energy did increase as well, but no applicable nuclear projects were listed for 2021.^{clxiv}

2030 emissions reduction targets consistent with 1.5 C (in accordance with fair share)

Column J in scorecard worksheet

- **African Union: Unknown.** Due to lack of union-wide data on a 2030 emissions reduction target and its associated fairness, the African Union is receiving a ? in place of a ✓ or ✗.
- **Argentina: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Argentina’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as critically insufficient when compared to its fair share contribution and not at all consistent with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit.^{clxv}
- **Australia: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Australia’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and “at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxvi}
- **Brazil: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Brazil’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as almost sufficient when compared to its fair share contribution to climate action– not yet consistent with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit.^{clxvii}
- **Canada: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Canada’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and “at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”

- **China: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates China's 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as highly insufficient – not at all in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit or “any interpretation of fairness.”^{clxxviii}
- **France: No.** France is included in the NDC of the European Union, which Climate Action Tracker rates as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.” Additionally, Climate Analytics rates France's national 2030 target (separate from the EU NDC) as not 1.5 degree C compatible, nor in alignment with its fair share of climate action.^{clxxix}
- **Germany: No.** Germany is included in the NDC of the European Union, which Climate Action Tracker rates as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.” Climate Action Tracker also rates Germany's national 2030 emissions reduction target (separate from the EU NDC) as insufficient and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxxx}
- **India: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates India's unconditional 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxxxi}
- **Indonesia: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Indonesia's unconditional 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as critically insufficient – not at all consistent with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and unaligned with what would be its fair share of global climate action.^{clxxxii}
- **Italy: No.** Italy is included in the NDC of the European Union, which Climate Action Tracker rates as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.” Additionally, Climate Analytics rates Italy's national 2030 target (separate from the EU NDC) as not 1.5 degree C compatible, nor in alignment with its fair share of climate action.^{clxxxiii}
- **Japan: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Japan's 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit or its fair share emissions allocation.^{clxxxiv}
- **Mexico: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Mexico's unconditional 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as critically insufficient – not at all in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit or “any interpretation of a fair approach” to meeting said limit.^{clxxxv}
- **Russia: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Russia's 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as critically insufficient – not at all in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit or “any interpretation of fairness.”^{clxxxvi}
- **Saudi Arabia: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Saudi Arabia's 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as critically insufficient – not at all in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit or “any interpretation of fairness.”^{clxxxvii}
- **South Africa: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates South Africa's 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxxxviii}

- **South Korea: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates South Korea’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as highly insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit (leading to rising emissions) or “any interpretation of a fair approach” to meeting the 1.5 target.^{clxxxix}
- **Turkey: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates Turkey’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as critically insufficient – not at all in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit or “any interpretation of a fair approach” to meeting the 1.5 target.^{clxxx}
- **United Kingdom: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates the UK’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxxxii}
- **United States: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates the USA’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxxxiii}
- **European Union: No.** Climate Action Tracker rates the European Union’s 2030 emissions reduction target in its NDC as insufficient – not in alignment with a 1.5 degree C temperature limit and at the “least stringent end of what would be a fair share of global effort.”^{clxxxiii}

Commitment to reduce methane emissions 30% from 2020 levels by 2030

Column K in scorecard worksheet

[Map of signatories](#) (blue) and countries yet to join (gray)

- **African Union: No.** Not every African Union country is a Global Methane Pledge signatory, and there is no evidence of a union-wide policy to reduce methane emissions 30% from 2020 levels by 2030.^{clxxxiv}
- **Argentina: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{clxxxv}
- **Australia: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{clxxxvi}
- **Brazil: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{clxxxvii}
- **Canada: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge. Canada also became a Global Methane Pledge champion during COP 28 in Dubai.^{clxxxviii}
- **China: No.**
- **Germany: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge. Germany also became a Global Methane Pledge champion during COP 28 in Dubai (2023).^{clxxxix}
- **India: No.**
- **Indonesia: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{cx}
- **Japan: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge. Japan also became a Global Methane Pledge champion during COP 28 in Dubai (2023).^{cxci}
- **Mexico: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{cxcii}
- **Russia: No.**
- **Saudi Arabia: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{cxci}
- **South Africa: No.**
- **South Korea: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{cxci}
- **Turkey: No.**

- **United Kingdom: Yes.** Signatory to Global Methane Pledge.^{cxcv}
- **United States: Yes.** The United States launched the Global Methane Pledge alongside the EU at COP 26 in Glasgow (2021).^{cxcvi}
- **European Union: Yes.** The EU launched the Global Methane Pledge alongside the United States at COP 26 in Glasgow (2021).^{cxcvii}

Stated support of MDB reform to increase climate funding and address the debt crisis

Column L in scorecard worksheet

Every country or supranational governing body was marked ✓ for this column due to their inclusion in the G20 Leaders' Declaration of 2023.^{cxcviii}

Social Progress Imperative's Just Transition Score

Column M in scorecard worksheet

All scores are from the Social Progress Imperative's Just Transition Score.^{cxci}

ⁱ https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_sgs_acceleration_agenda.pdf

ⁱⁱ https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/un_sgs_acceleration_agenda.pdf

ⁱⁱⁱ <https://web.archive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20230313120149/https://ukcop26.org/global-coal-to-clean-power-transition-statement/>

^{iv} <https://poweringpastcoal.org/our-work/>

^v <https://archive.ph/118Sq#selection-2295.146-2295.263;>

https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/G20ROMELEADERSDECLARATION_o.pdf

^{vi} <https://energyfinance.org/#/data;>

<https://energyfinance.org/OCI%20Public%20Finance%20for%20Energy%20Database%20-%20Download%20Copy.xlsx>

^{vii} <https://energyfinance.org/#/data;>

<https://energyfinance.org/OCI%20Public%20Finance%20for%20Energy%20Database%20-%20Download%20Copy.xlsx>

^{viii} <https://energyfinance.org/#/data;> <https://energyfinance.org/#/about#do-the-amounts-reported-here-include-all-g20-international-public-finance-for-energy> Note that there is some inconsistency here in which countries are marked as having limited or no direct reporting: Australia has an asterisk next to it but is not on the list on the "About" page, and Turkey is on the list on the "About" page but does not have an asterisk next to it. We include both here on our list.

^{ix} <https://energyfinance.org/#/data;>

<https://energyfinance.org/OCI%20Public%20Finance%20for%20Energy%20Database%20-%20Download%20Copy.xlsx>

^x <https://www.cbd.int/aichi-targets/target/3>

^{xi} <https://www.socialprogress.org/2023-just-transition-score/>

^{xii} https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/41959-doc-CC_Strategy_and_Action_Plan_2022-2032_08_02_23_Single_Print_Ready.pdf pg. 10

^{xiii} <https://phys.org/news/2022-10-africa-caution-net-goal-cop27.html>

^{xiv} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/argentina/net-zero-targets/>

^{xv} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/australia/net-zero-targets/>

^{xvi} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil/net-zero-targets/>

^{xvii} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada/net-zero-targets/>

^{xviii} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/net-zero-targets/>

^{xix} <https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/english-articles/value-climate-action;> <https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-carbon-brief-profile-france/>

^{xx} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/germany/net-zero-targets/>

^{xxi} <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/india/net-zero-targets/>

^{xxii} [https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/indonesia/net-zero-targets/;](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/indonesia/net-zero-targets/) <https://www.iea.org/reports/an-energy-sector-roadmap-to-net-zero-emissions-in-indonesia>

^{xxiii} [https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/net-zero-targets/;](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/net-zero-targets/)

https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/SWD_Assessment_draft_updated_NECP_Italy_2023.pdf pg. 9;

<https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2023-10/ES-2023-10-17%20EU%20submission%20NDC%20update.pdf>

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xxiv <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/net-zero-targets/>

xxv <https://mx.usembassy.gov/united-states-welcome-mexicos-commitments-announced-during-cop-27/>;

https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf pg. 3;

<https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/mexico/net-zero-targets/>

xxvi <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/net-zero-targets/>

xxvii <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/saudi-arabia/net-zero-targets/>

xxviii <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/south-africa/net-zero-targets/>

xxix <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/south-korea/net-zero-targets/>

xxx <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/turkey/net-zero-targets/>; <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies>

xxxi <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/uk/net-zero-targets/>

xxxii <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/net-zero-targets/>

xxxiii <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/HR-03-06-2020%20EU%20Submission%20on%20Long%20term%20strategy.pdf>;

<https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/net-zero-targets/>

xxxiv

<https://media.africaclimatesummit.org/NAIROBI+Declaration+FURTHER+edited+060923+EN+920AM.pdf?request-content-type=%22application/force-download%22>

xxxv <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/AR>

xxxvi <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/AU>

xxxvii <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/BR>

xxxviii <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/CA>

xxxix <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/CN>

xl <https://beyondfossilfuels.org/europes-coal-exit/>; [https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/FR](https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/FR;);

<https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/23814-loi-energie-et-climat-du-8-novembre-2019>

xli <https://www.euractiv.com/section/coal/news/france-extends-life-of-last-coal-fired-plants-to-avoid-winter-shortfalls/>

xlii <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/DE>

xliii <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-16/germany-in-talks-with-coal-giant-to-end-mining-eight-years-early>; <https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/german-finance-minister-rejects-2030-coal-exit-without-affordable-and-secure-alternatives>

xliv <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/IN>

xlv <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/indonesia/policies-action/>;

<https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/have-coal-will-use-it-indonesias-climate-stance-raises-questions/>;

<https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/ID>

xlvi <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/IT>; https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-02/it_final_necp_main_en_0.pdf pg. 8; <https://beyondfossilfuels.org/europes-coal-exit/>;

<https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/IT>; <https://beyondfossilfuels.org/2023/12/07/italy-hungary-and-north-macedonia-delay-coal-exits/>

<https://beyondfossilfuels.org/2023/12/07/italy-hungary-and-north-macedonia-delay-coal-exits/>

xlvii <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/JP>

xlviii <https://poweringpastcoal.org/members/>; <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/MX>

xlix <https://bloombergcoalcountdown.com/countries/RU>

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